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The results of the tax as we propose would significantly contribute to solving the overfishing problem. We not only value the tax as a revenue-generating device, but also as a mechanism for covering the ecological and societal cost of taking each fish out of the ocean.
Works Cited
Subsidies
STATUS: most of the information is there, but it needs to be revised and put into order
Many countries subsidize their fishing industries because of the important role it plays in their job economy and food supply. Annual subsidies for fishing amount to $10 to $15 billion world wide---possibly more than 25 percent of the annual $56 billion trade in fish.
Fishing subsidies come in many forms. Direct government payments to the industry include a grants made for the purchase of new fishing vessels, vessel decommissioning payments (buybacks), fishermen's unemployment insurance, compensation for closed seasons, equity infusions, and price support programs (Schrank, 2003).
American and Canadian fisheries have been highly subsidized for many years in order to develop their domestic fisheries. Apart from that, they have also used approximately US$3,000,000,000 on income maintenance for unemployed fishermen and fish plant workers and improving fisheries science. In 1990s, when people started to realize the problem of overfishing, both countries started to subsidize to develop technologies to reduce capacity. (Schrank, 2003)
Norway, one of the largest cod-catching countries, grants loans to their fishing industries to support the export of their fishing market. They also grant loans to vessel arrangements, price support, insurance subsidies, operating subsidies, minimum income guarantees, vacation support and unemployment insurance, bait subsidies, gear subisidies and damage compensation) (Schrank, 2003)
Some are harmful; some may help to solve the problem of overfishing. In view of this, WTO agreed on restricting subsidies designed to promote export and establish controls over other form of subsidies. Canada, Japan, and other countries with a large fishery industry, however, endorse the "no-need approach" in which no restriction of subsidies should be imposed as they dispute the casual link between subsidies and overexploitation of fish resources. They propose fisheries management regimes deal with catch controls (quotas), effort controls (restrictions on boat size, engine power and days at sea, etc.) and right-based structures (permits, individual transferable quotas, etc.). Therefore, in Japan's view, it would be unfair if these varying situations are ignored and certain fisheries subsidies automatically prohibited. (Benitah, 2004)
Other countries propose the Traffic Light approach: red (forbidden subsidies), green (permitted subsidies), amber (slow down, which means that subsidies may be subjected to a complaint on the basis of their adverse trade effects). By this approach, desirable subsidies will be maintained while direct payment to promote export would be banned or discouraged.
This measure has been supported by countries like Norway. (Benitah, 2004)
However, difficulties exist in the elimination of subsidies. As subsidies are regarded as one of the invisible protectionist measures, it is almost impossible to measure the amount of subsidies that a country provides to is fishing industry.
Currently subsidies are costing the governments around the world billions of dollars and only harming the state of fisheries by increasing the fishing effort and making it easier for us to deplete the fishing stock. Money is directed to lower the costs of shipbuilding, to compensate fishermen, and to establish joint fishermen, among other things. Studies show that fishing subsidies for the Distant Water Fleets of developed nations are harming the economy and growth of developing nations. Fishing subsidies should be eliminated and the money should instead be directed to conservation programs.
Works Cited
Milazzo, M. (2000). The World Bank: Subsidies in World Fisheries: A Re-examination. Technical Paper, No. 406, 4-6.
Benitah, M. (June 2004). Ongoing WTO Negotiations on Fisheries SUbsidies. ASIL Insights, 1-3.
Schrank, W. (2003). Introducing Fisheries Subsidies. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, 437, 1-5United United Nations Division for Sustainable Development. (2004). Agenda 21, Chapter 34. Retrieved 21 November 2007, from: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter34.htm.
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