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There is also evidence to suggest that world powers, such as the United States, would support the hard restrictions against flags of convenience and unsustainable (including IUU) fish: Section 603 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act states, "The United States, or any agency or official acting on behalf of the United States, may not enter into any international agreement with respect to the conservation and management of living marine resources or the use of the high seas by fishing vessels that would prevent full implementation of the global moratorium on large-scale driftnet fishing on the high seas, as such moratorium is expressed in Resolution 46/215 of the United Nations General Assembly" (P.L. 94-265, 2007).

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Global Taxes as a Long Term Management Strategy

One of the most essential challenges facing developing states is the transition from a fish-dominated economy and diet to a less fish-dependent one. After all, for many of these developing states, the cheapest way to acquire protein and generate income is to fish their oceans - fish is free, regenerates without human effort, and comes at no cost to the harvester (no farming, plowing, or planning required). Thus, developing states often do not have incentives or reasons of why they should alter their economy. This is where assistance from developed states should come in.

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Under Part XII, Section 3, Articles 202 and 203 require that "States shall, directly or through competent international organizations \[which could include the RFB councils we have recommended\]: promote programmes of scientific, educational, technical and other assistance to developing States for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution.  Such assistance shall include... training of their scientific and technical personnel; facilitating their participation in relevant international programmes; supplying them with necessary equipment and facilities; enhancing their capacity to manufacture such equipment; advice on and developing facilities for research, monitoring, educational and other programmes... \[States shall also give developing nations preferential treatment for\] the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance; and the utilization of their specialized services" (Division, 1984). Therefore, it is reasonable to enhance the system in which developed nations provide incentives for developing states to shift to more environmentally-sound aquaculture practices and fishing methods. In particular, financial assistance, technical education, and sharing of mutual scientific research are especially called for. The visit of scientific experts qualified in the areas of environmental conservation to developing countries should be sponsored. Moreover, joint ventures between the developing and the developed nations with the aim of creating mutual benefit through environmental conservation and deterring IUU fishing (for example: creating marine reserves or assisting with marine tourism in the target country) should be encouraged as a method of cooperation (Agenda 21). Also, developing nations and developed nations may work together in marine research, with developing nations supplying the labor and local knowledge of conducting the scientific experiments and the developed nations providing the experts in guiding and designing the experiments. Eventually, the technology can also shift over so that local experts will be trained and the developing nations will be able to generate research capabilities on their own. This creates revenue and promotes environmentalism amongst the bloc of developing nations. Mission hopes to encourage more collaboration between the developed and the developing worlds in order to stabilize marine ecosystems and eventually global fisheries. This collaboration can be nurtured through communication between the regional councils and continued interaction in the UN.

The Whaling Solution

We, as the Terrascope Mission 2011 group, recognize the need to protect whales from the threat of extinction and exploitation. Thus, we endorse the IWC zero catch limit moratorium until sufficient research has proved that whale populations have reached a stable, sustainable level. The catch limits set for approved aboriginal communities should be kept in addition to existing whale sanctuaries. We also endorse the trading regulations set by CITES to prevent the import and export of endangered and threatened cetacean species.

We also recognize the need for scientific research to gain more information about whale populations. However, we advocate means of gathering data that do not involve the lethal killing of whales; other methods, such as tagging and sighting, would be preferred. Should lethal means are inevitable, a limit as to how many whales can be used should be set. Thus, we propose that all proposals involving lethal research must be approved by the Scientific Committee set up by the IWC, which would follow the guidelines issued by the Commission. The rate of usage during such research should not exceed the growth rate of the whale population; in the case that the growth rate of the population is not yet known, the number of whales used should not exceed 5% of the current population size (growth rates for whale populations have found between 3% and 12%) (IWC, 2007a). Article VIII of the 1946 IWC Convention must be amended to allow this change (IWC, 2007b).

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Photo by Lindy Elkins Tanton
The remains of a pilot whale hunt.

Global Taxes as a Long Term Management Strategy

One of the greatest challenges presented by the current plight of worldwide fisheries is that of preventing overfishing. This prevention, if successful, will be the single greatest improvement over the current situation. How is this to be achieved? As long as there is a demand for fish, there will be motivation to fish and a risk of overfishing. The best possible solution to the problem of overfishing will therefore be the one which has the most probability of limiting catches to the maximum sustainable yield level.

The first step to limiting the catch to a level that can maintain the maximum sustainable yield is to define maximum sustainable yield, which can be found in our fisheries management section. The next step is to determine numerically what this level must be. Data collected through fish tracking, population surveys, and other methods and technology, some of which are in use today and some of which are new and are suggested in other parts of our report, will be used to estimate the total population and health of the oceanic ecosystems all over the global. The result will be location-specific information about the amount of fish that can be taken from any given area in the world to still maintain a sustainable fishery.

Once it is known at what level each fishery in the world can be fished while not exceeding the maximum sustainable yield level, how do we make sure that fisheries are only fished up to that level and no more? Many quotas have been implemented over the last few decades in an attempt to achieve this goal. These quotas vary in type and specific purpose, but they all aim to set a limit on how much fish can be removed from a given fishery in order to prevent overfishing. Quotas are discussed in detail in other sections of this report, and they are a useful tool that we intend to continue using in a limited capacity. Yet a quota-only system has, in all this time, failed to deliver the widespread halt to overfishing that must be achieved in order to save the fish. Therefore, a new, novel approach must be applied to the problem, which is where a global taxation scheme comes in.

We favor a tax scheme formulated from the suggestions of Professor Wheaton, economics professor as MIT, with exceptions. The tax's primary basis would be scientific knowledge. Based on data collected on populations through the methods stated in this report, the ecological health of fish populations around the world and the relative risk of these populations being overfished and becoming depleted could be assessed by an international group of biologists. These biologists would split up the global international ocean into a number, perhaps between twenty and thirty, of distinct regions (Wheaton, personal communication, November 21, 2007). The biologists would analyze the data from each region and determine the overall danger to fish populations in each of the regions. These biologist would then apprise a group of economists of their findings. The economists would use this information to set a tax that is heavier for fish caught in regions and from populations containing more depleted stocks and lighter for fish caught in areas where the populations are less at risk of being overfished, i.e. the level of fishing that can happen and still remain below or equal to the maximum sustainable yield is higher.

The goal of the tax is to make is economically unsound for the fishermen to overfish. If a fisherman catches very little fish, he generates very little revenue from selling the fish, but if he catches too many fish, the amount he will be paying in taxes will largely detract from his revenue. There is a point in between the two extremes at which the fishermen will be making the maximum profit after he has paid his taxes, and the biologists and economists determining the tax will make this maximum profit point a number that will ensure the fisheries will be fished at a sustainable rate.

A tax on fishermen will drive up the price of fish for consumers, which will in turn decrease the quantity of fish demanded and thus the number of fish needed to meet this demand. A market-based control on fishing decreases the fisherman's incentive to overfish. The fisherman still has freedom to fish wherever he wants (within other constraints), but the tax will also encourage him to avoid fishing in areas that are in more danger of being overfished.

There have been no prior attempts to levy an international tax to curb environmental damage, but we believe that since fish are a common resource that travel between national borders, and fish from one fishery are often sold to consumers all over the world, this environmental crisis will require much dedication to international cooperation. Implementation of this tax scheme will begin following years of strict command-and-control management strategies, such as quotas, which will bring the status of many fisheries from "overfished" to "sustainably fished."

Given the metamorphic nature of fisheries and the environment in general, the level of taxes will need to be adjusted from time to time. Currently, data on fish populations is generally collected and reported every two years, meaning that this team of biologists and economists would reset the tax at least every two years to account for changing conditions, and perhaps more often based on preliminary data, estimates, or sizable environmental changes (such as natural disasters). Alterations to the taxes at intervals would be necessary to keep them relevant and useful, since a permanent and static tax would simply encourage individuals to fish in areas that are lightly taxed, leading to overfishing and populations crashes.

In the case of subsistence fishing and sportsfishing, we feel that quotas are still a better tool for maintaining a ceiling on the amount of fish caught for this purpose. Oftentimes subsistence fishermen have virtually no choice about the location in which they fish, and they should not be penalized for this. More important is the fact that subsistence fishing is not involved in the global fish market, since it never enters this market in the first place. Therefore a tax that decreases the demand by raising the price is irrelevant. However, subsistence fishing should not be a reason for taking an unreasonable amount of fish, which is why quotas are necessary. For sportsfisherman, permits can be issued to effect these quotas.

The tax would be administered internationally by the United Nations, provided for by the addition to the treaty that we propose. Only member countries would collect the tax, which eliminates the issue of taxation without representation. The revenue of the tax would then be used to fund other aspects of our plan, like encouraging fishermen to switch to more environmentally sound methods of fishing. Countries who have signed the treaty are bound by it to fish sustainably in their own waters, and a tax is just another way for them to enforce this. Non-member countries are prohibited from being involved in fish trade with member countries, so they too will be affected by the tax.

The results of the tax as we propose would significantly contribute to solving the overfishing problem. We not only value the tax as a revenue-generating device, but also as a mechanism for covering the ecological and societal cost of taking each fish out of the ocean.

Subsidies

STATUS: most of the information is there, but it needs to be revised and put into order

Many countries subsidize their fishing industries because of the important role it plays in their job economy and food supply. Annual subsidies for fishing amount to $10 to $15 billion world wide---possibly more than 25 percent of the annual $56 billion trade in fish.

Fishing subsidies come in many forms. Direct government payments to the industry include a grants made for the purchase of new fishing vessels, vessel decommissioning payments (buybacks), fishermen's unemployment insurance, compensation for closed seasons, equity infusions, and price support programs (Schrank, 2003).

American and Canadian fisheries have been highly subsidized for many years in order to develop their domestic fisheries. Apart from that, they have also used approximately US$3,000,000,000 on income maintenance for unemployed fishermen and fish plant workers and improving fisheries science. In 1990s, when people started to realize the problem of overfishing, both countries started to subsidize to develop technologies to reduce capacity. (Schrank, 2003)

Norway, one of the largest cod-catching countries, grants loans to their fishing industries to support the export of their fishing market. They also grant loans to vessel arrangements, price support, insurance subsidies, operating subsidies, minimum income guarantees, vacation support and unemployment insurance, bait subsidies, gear subisidies and damage compensation) (Schrank, 2003)

Some are harmful; some may help to solve the problem of overfishing. In view of this, WTO agreed on restricting subsidies designed to promote export and establish controls over other form of subsidies. Canada, Japan, and other countries with a large fishery industry, however, endorse the "no-need approach" in which no restriction of subsidies should be imposed as they dispute the casual link between subsidies and overexploitation of fish resources. They propose fisheries management regimes deal with catch controls (quotas), effort controls (restrictions on boat size, engine power and days at sea, etc.) and right-based structures (permits, individual transferable quotas, etc.). Therefore, in Japan's view, it would be unfair if these varying situations are ignored and certain fisheries subsidies automatically prohibited. (Benitah, 2004)
Other countries propose the Traffic Light approach: red (forbidden subsidies), green (permitted subsidies), amber (slow down, which means that subsidies may be subjected to a complaint on the basis of their adverse trade effects). By this approach, desirable subsidies will be maintained while direct payment to promote export would be banned or discouraged.
This measure has been supported by countries like Norway. (Benitah, 2004)
However, difficulties exist in the elimination of subsidies. As subsidies are regarded as one of the invisible protectionist measures, it is almost impossible to measure the amount of subsidies that a country provides to is fishing industry.

greatest challenges presented by the current plight of worldwide fisheries is that of preventing overfishing. This prevention, if successful, will be the single greatest improvement over the current situation. How is this to be achieved? As long as there is a demand for fish, there will be motivation to fish and a risk of overfishing. The best possible solution to the problem of overfishing will therefore be the one which has the most probability of limiting catches to the maximum sustainable yield level.