International Treaty
In Mission, our toughest challenge has been finding a solution to one of the world's greatest problems, the oceans. To address this problem, our solution will be implemented on international, national, non-governmental, and individual levels to comprise one cohesive, over-arching solution.
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International Treaty
To ensure that our solution reaches the highest pinnacles of government and society, we have developed an international forum for discussion, regulation, and innovation in the realm of marine ecosystems and fisheries protection. Currently, the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea governs codifies conventional international law (EarthTrust). The Law of the Sea, or LOS, has been supplemented by other legislation, including the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. It is our vision to call another UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Preservation of the Oceans. This Convention would concern the introduction of a new agreement (treaty) among nations to meet the following objectives as defined by Mission 2011: end overfishing, preserve marine ecosystems, and develop alternative measures to meet the nutritional needs of the international populace.
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The Agreement for the Introduction of Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Preservation of the Oceans will include the aquaculture, marine protected area, climate and , environment, fishery management, technology, plans for future research, and additional international cooperation aspects of our solution. Some examples of treaty specifics include:
- The the Marine Protected Areas "ten percent plan," which requires that 10% of the world oceans should be covered with No-Take Marine Reserves within fifteen years
- Aquaculture aquaculture facilities will to be encouraged an and implemented where possible as determined by the Regional Assessment Councils (to be discussed in latter section)
- agreement of Signatory States will agree to uphold the articles of this Treaty and thereby enforce them within their territorial waters. A signatory State will not allow fishing fleets to register under the State's flag if that same fleet is registered under a non-signatory State's flag that has been found to violate the Law of the Sea, the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, or this Treaty.
- agreement of Signatory States Additionally, signatory States agree to stop all import of fish or fishery products that were caught unsustainably as found by this Treaty and the aforementioned UN law
- Enforcement enforcement regulation of IUU fishing by member States (to be discussed under "Enforcement")
- To reduce and contain overfishing, the reduction of overfishing and transition to sustainable fishing through a two phased plan for quotas and taxes will be implemented, requiring which requires first that Individual Transfer Quotas (ITQ) be assigned and assessed by regional councils (to be discussed in latter sections) with a transition into mostly regional taxes
- the elimination of subsidies used to sponsor increased fishing efforts and the implementation of subsidies used to sponsor new technology that will reduce bycatch
- if If and when the Arctic circle melts, concerned States can consider the territorial seas, which follow the mandated 12 nautical miles from the baseline, to be within jurisdiction, but that no EEZ will be established beyond that, such that the remaining area will be considered by a panel for the status of a marine protected area
- more stringent environmental impacts regulations to curb the effects of dumping by cruise ships, airliners, and city waste
How to Introduce the Treaty
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The enforcement of this treaty to deter IUU practices is two-fold: disputes and suspicions of illegal activity are settled through the Tribunal system, while international enforcement to deter IUU fishing is the responsibility of member states. This Treaty calls for the implementation of regulatory fleets (similar to the U.S. Coast Guard) to patrol the EEZ of a member State. The treaty encourages the strict enforcement - enabled by GPS tracking - through boat confiscation and freezing of assets. On the high seas, it is any member State's responsibility to report illegal activity to the Tribunals of other member States. If a non-member is found to be defying the regulations outlines by this treaty or other UN laws relating to the seas, then it is the responsibility of each member State to stop all commercial agreements with this party (as per the aforementioned provisions of the treaty).
Membership
Because States are not permitted to trade with or allow unsustainable flag-hopping ships (ships that fish using unsustainable methods under other flags to avoid breaking this treaty) to fly their flag, any ship found to break this agreement will be possessed by the member State. The State may freeze the assets of the offender until the ship and catch are rendered. The State may then sell the seized vessels and materials or use them as it sees fit.
Membership
Nations with any interest in preserving a Nations with any interest in preserving a resource that billions of people depend on daily will be obligated to sign this document, as it is the only measure currently capable of addressing the global crisis. This treaty is modeled after science and policy currently being researched and implemented all over the world. In most cases, this Treaty simply improves upon the actions already being taken by states in an attempt to progress existing initiatives.
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There is also evidence to suggest that world powers, such as the United States, would support the hard restrictions against flags of convenience and unsustainable (including IUU) fish: Section 603 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act states, "The United States, or any agency or official acting on behalf of the United States, may not enter into any international agreement with respect to the conservation and management of living marine resources or the use of the high seas by fishing vessels that would prevent full implementation of the global moratorium on large-scale driftnet fishing on the high seas, as such moratorium is expressed in Resolution 46/215 of the United Nations General Assembly" (P.L. 94-265, 2007).
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Global Taxes as a Long Term Management Strategy
One of the most essential challenges facing developing states is the transition from a fish-dominated economy and diet to a less fish-dependent one. After all, for many of these developing states, the cheapest way to acquire protein and generate income is to fish their oceans - fish is free, regenerates without human effort, and comes at no cost to the harvester (no farming, plowing, or planning required). Thus, developing states often do not have incentives or reasons of why they should alter their economy. This is where assistance from developed states should come in.
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Under Part XII, Section 3, Articles 202 and 203 require that "States shall, directly or through competent international organizations \[which could include the RFB councils we have recommended\]: promote programmes of scientific, educational, technical and other assistance to developing States for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. Such assistance shall include... training of their scientific and technical personnel; facilitating their participation in relevant international programmes; supplying them with necessary equipment and facilities; enhancing their capacity to manufacture such equipment; advice on and developing facilities for research, monitoring, educational and other programmes... \[States shall also give developing nations preferential treatment for\] the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance; and the utilization of their specialized services" (Division, 1984). Therefore, it is reasonable to enhance the system in which developed nations provide incentives for developing states to shift to more environmentally-sound aquaculture practices and fishing methods. In particular, financial assistance, technical education, and sharing of mutual scientific research are especially called for. The visit of scientific experts qualified in the areas of environmental conservation to developing countries should be sponsored. Moreover, joint ventures between the developing and the developed nations with the aim of creating mutual benefit through environmental conservation and deterring IUU fishing (for example: creating marine reserves or assisting with marine tourism in the target country) should be encouraged as a method of cooperation (Agenda 21). Also, developing nations and developed nations may work together in marine research, with developing nations supplying the labor and local knowledge of conducting the scientific experiments and the developed nations providing the experts in guiding and designing the experiments. Eventually, the technology can also shift over so that local experts will be trained and the developing nations will be able to generate research capabilities on their own. This creates revenue and promotes environmentalism amongst the bloc of developing nations. Mission hopes to encourage more collaboration between the developed and the developing worlds in order to stabilize marine ecosystems and eventually global fisheries. This collaboration can be nurtured through communication between the regional councils and continued interaction in the UN. |
The Whaling Solution
We, as the Terrascope Mission 2011 group, recognize the need to protect whales from the threat of extinction and exploitation. Thus, we endorse the IWC zero catch limit moratorium until sufficient research has proved that whale populations have reached a stable, sustainable level. The catch limits set for approved aboriginal communities should be kept in addition to existing whale sanctuaries. We also endorse the trading regulations set by CITES to prevent the import and export of endangered and threatened cetacean species.
We also recognize the need for scientific research to gain more information about whale populations. However, we advocate means of gathering data that do not involve the lethal killing of whales; other methods, such as tagging and sighting, would be preferred. Should lethal means are inevitable, a limit as to how many whales can be used should be set. Thus, we propose that all proposals involving lethal research must be approved by the Scientific Committee set up by the IWC, which would follow the guidelines issued by the Commission. The rate of usage during such research should not exceed the growth rate of the whale population; in the case that the growth rate of the population is not yet known, the number of whales used should not exceed 5% of the current population size (growth rates for whale populations have found between 3% and 12%) (IWC, 2007a). Article VIII of the 1946 IWC Convention must be amended to allow this change (IWC, 2007b).
Photo by Lindy Elkins Tanton
The remains of a pilot whale hunt.
Global Taxes as a Long Term Management Strategy
One of the greatest challenges presented by the current plight of worldwide fisheries is that of preventing overfishing. This prevention, if successful, will be the single greatest improvement over the current situation. How is this to be achieved? As long as there is a demand for fish, there will be motivation to fish and a risk of overfishing. The best possible solution to the problem of overfishing will therefore be the one which has the most probability of limiting catches to the maximum sustainable yield level.
The first step to limiting the catch to a level that can maintain the maximum sustainable yield is to define maximum sustainable yield, which can be found in our fisheries management section. The next step is to determine numerically what this level must be. Data collected through fish tracking, population surveys, and other methods and technology, some of which are in use today and some of which are new and are suggested in other parts of our report, will be used to estimate the total population and health of the oceanic ecosystems all over the global. The result will be location-specific information about the amount of fish that can be taken from any given area in the world to still maintain a sustainable fishery.
Once it is known at what level each fishery in the world can be fished while not exceeding the maximum sustainable yield level, how do we make sure that fisheries are only fished up to that level and no more? Many quotas have been implemented over the last few decades in an attempt to achieve this goal. These quotas vary in type and specific purpose, but they all aim to set a limit on how much fish can be removed from a given fishery in order to prevent overfishing. Quotas are discussed in detail in other sections of this report, and they are a useful tool that we intend to continue using in a limited capacity. Yet a quota-only system has, in all this time, failed to deliver the widespread halt to overfishing that must be achieved in order to save the fish. Therefore, a new, novel approach must be applied to the problem, which is where a global taxation scheme comes in.
We favor a tax scheme formulated from the suggestions of Professor Wheaton, economics professor as MIT, with exceptions. The tax's primary basis would be scientific knowledge. Based on data collected on populations through the methods stated in this report, the ecological health of fish populations around the world and the relative risk of these populations being overfished and becoming depleted could be assessed by an international group of biologists. These biologists would split up the global international ocean into a number, perhaps between twenty and thirty, of distinct regions (Wheaton, personal communication, November 21, 2007). The biologists would analyze the data from each region and determine the overall danger to fish populations in each of the regions. These biologist would then apprise a group of economists of their findings. The economists would use this information to set a tax that is heavier for fish caught in regions and from populations containing more depleted stocks and lighter for fish caught in areas where the populations are less at risk of being overfished, i.e. the level of fishing that can happen and still remain below or equal to the maximum sustainable yield is higher.
The goal of the tax is to make is economically unsound for the fishermen to overfish. If a fisherman catches very little fish, he generates very little revenue from selling the fish, but if he catches too many fish, the amount he will be paying in taxes will largely detract from his revenue. There is a point in between the two extremes at which the fishermen will be making the maximum profit after he has paid his taxes, and the biologists and economists determining the tax will make this maximum profit point a number that will ensure the fisheries will be fished at a sustainable rate.
A tax on fishermen will drive up the price of fish for consumers, which will in turn decrease the quantity of fish demanded and thus the number of fish needed to meet this demand. A market-based control on fishing decreases the fisherman's incentive to overfish. The fisherman still has freedom to fish wherever he wants (within other constraints), but the tax will also encourage him to avoid fishing in areas that are in more danger of being overfished.
There have been no prior attempts to levy an international tax to curb environmental damage, but we believe that since fish are a common resource that travel between national borders, and fish from one fishery are often sold to consumers all over the world, this environmental crisis will require much dedication to international cooperation. Implementation of this tax scheme will begin following years of strict command-and-control management strategies, such as quotas, which will bring the status of many fisheries from "overfished" to "sustainably fished."
Given the metamorphic nature of fisheries and the environment in general, the level of taxes will need to be adjusted from time to time. Currently, data on fish populations is generally collected and reported every two years, meaning that this team of biologists and economists would reset the tax at least every two years to account for changing conditions, and perhaps more often based on preliminary data, estimates, or sizable environmental changes (such as natural disasters). Alterations to the taxes at intervals would be necessary to keep them relevant and useful, since a permanent and static tax would simply encourage individuals to fish in areas that are lightly taxed, leading to overfishing and populations crashes.
In the case of subsistence fishing and sportsfishing, we feel that quotas are still a better tool for maintaining a ceiling on the amount of fish caught for this purpose. Oftentimes subsistence fishermen have virtually no choice about the location in which they fish, and they should not be penalized for this. More important is the fact that subsistence fishing is not involved in the global fish market, since it never enters this market in the first place. Therefore a tax that decreases the demand by raising the price is irrelevant. However, subsistence fishing should not be a reason for taking an unreasonable amount of fish, which is why quotas are necessary. For sportsfisherman, permits can be issued to effect these quotas.
The tax would be administered internationally by the United Nations, provided for by the addition to the treaty that we propose. Only member countries would collect the tax, which eliminates the issue of taxation without representation. The revenue of the tax would then be used to fund other aspects of our plan, like encouraging fishermen to switch to more environmentally sound methods of fishing. Countries who have signed the treaty are bound by it to fish sustainably in their own waters, and a tax is just another way for them to enforce this. Non-member countries are prohibited from being involved in fish trade with member countries, so they too will be affected by the tax.
The results of the tax as we propose would significantly contribute to solving the overfishing problem. We not only value the tax as a revenue-generating device, but also as a mechanism for covering the ecological and societal cost of taking each fish out of the ocean.
Works Cited
greatest challenges presented by the current plight of worldwide fisheries is that of preventing overfishing. This prevention, if successful, will be the single greatest improvement over the current situation. However, as long as there is demand for fish, there will be motivation to fish and a risk of overfishing. The best possible solution to the problem of overfishing will therefore be the one which has the most probability of limiting catches to the maximum sustainable yield level.
The first step to limiting the catch to a level that can maintain the maximum sustainable yield is to define maximum sustainable yield, which can be found in our fisheries management section. The next step is to determine numerically what this level must be. Data collected through fish tracking, population surveys, and other methods and technology, some of which are in use today and some of which are new and are suggested in other parts of our report, will be used to estimate the total population and health of the oceanic ecosystems all over the global. The result will be location-specific information about the amount of fish that can be taken from any given area in the world to still maintain a sustainable fishery.
Once it is known at what level each fishery in the world can be fished while not exceeding the maximum sustainable yield level, we must ensure that fisheries are only fished up to that level. Quotas have been implemented over the last few decades in an attempt to achieve this goal. These quotas vary in type and specific purpose, but they all aim to set a limit on how much fish can be removed from a given fishery in order to prevent overfishing. Quotas are discussed in detail in other sections of this report, and they are a useful tool that we intend to continue using in a limited capacity. Yet, a quota-based system has failed to deliver the widespread halt in overfishing necessary to save the fish. Therefore, a novel approach, such as global taxation, is needed.
We recommend a tax-based fishery management system endorsed by economist William Wheaton. The tax's basis would be scientific knowledge. An international group of biologists would divide the ocean into perhaps twenty or thirty distinct regions. Then, they would use fish population data to assess the ecological health of fisheries and determine the fisheries' relative risks of being overfished (W. Wheaton, personal communication, November 21, 2007). The findings would be reported to a group of economists who would use this information to set taxes. The tax would be heavier for fish caught in regions and from populations containing depleted stocks and lighter for fish caught in areas where the populations are less at risk of being overfished, i.e. the level of fishing that can happen and still remain below or equal to the maximum sustainable yield is higher.
The goal of the tax is to make is economically unsound for the fishermen to overfish. If a fisherman catches very little fish, he generates very little revenue from selling the fish, but if he catches too many fish, the amount he will be paying in taxes will largely detract from his revenue. There is a point in between the two extremes at which the fishermen will be making the maximum profit after he has paid his taxes, and the biologists and economists determining the tax will make this maximum profit point a number that will ensure the fisheries will be fished at a sustainable rate.
A tax on fishermen will drive up the price of fish for consumers, which will in turn decrease the quantity of fish demanded and thus the number of fish needed to meet this demand. A market-based control on fishing decreases the fisherman's incentive to overfish. The fisherman still has freedom to fish wherever he wants (within other constraints), but the tax will also encourage him to avoid fishing in areas that are in more danger of being overfished.
There have been no prior attempts to levy an international tax to curb environmental damage, but we believe that since fish are a common resource that travel between national borders, and fish from one fishery are often sold to consumers all over the world, this environmental crisis will require much dedication to international cooperation. Implementation of this tax scheme will begin following years of strict command-and-control management strategies, such as quotas, which will bring the status of many fisheries from "overfished" to "sustainably fished."
Given the metamorphic nature of fisheries and the environment in general, the level of taxes will need to be adjusted from time to time. Currently, data on fish populations is generally collected and reported every two years, meaning that this team of biologists and economists would reset the tax at least every two years to account for changing conditions, and perhaps more often based on preliminary data, estimates, or sizable environmental changes (such as natural disasters). Alterations to the taxes at intervals would be necessary to keep them relevant and useful, since a permanent and static tax would simply encourage individuals to fish in areas that are lightly taxed, leading to overfishing and populations crashes.
In the case of subsistence fishing and sport fishing, we feel that quotas are still a better tool for maintaining a ceiling on the amount of fish caught for this purpose. Oftentimes subsistence fishermen have virtually no choice about the location in which they fish, and they should not be penalized for this. More important is the fact that subsistence fishing is not involved in the global fish market, since it never enters this market in the first place. Therefore a tax that decreases the demand by raising the price is irrelevant. However, subsistence fishing should not be a reason for taking an unreasonable amount of fish, which is why quotas are necessary. For sport fisherman, permits can be issued to effect these quotas.
The taxes would be calculated by an international committee. Only countries that ratify the treaty would collect the tax, eliminating the issue of taxation without representation. The revenue of the tax would then be used to fund other aspects of our plan, like encouraging fishermen to switch to more environmentally sound methods of fishing. Countries who have signed the treaty are bound by it to fish sustainably in their own waters, and a tax is just another way for them to enforce this. Non-member countries are prohibited from being involved in fish trade with member countries, so they too will be affected by the tax.
In Summary
- All member countries who have ratified our treaty will impose a tax on their fishermen
- This amount of this tax will be region and population specific: higher if fish are caught from populations that are more depleted and lower if fish are from less depleted stocks
- The tax will be determined by an international group of biologists and economists who will have access to global data collected through the most advanced and accurate methods possible
- The revenue from the tax will go to efforts to convert fishermen to more environmentally friendly methods, developing better data collection technologies, and generally funding other parts of the process to save the ocean.
The tax we are proposing would significantly contribute to solving overfishing. The tax is not only a revenue-generating device, but also a mechanism for paying the environmental cost associated with taking a fish out of the ocean.
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Non-governmental Organizations
The international treaty we propose will be a key tool in working to unite leaders of countries across the world and help them establish policies in their own country to curb overfishing. Some of our ideas, however, especially those concerning education and awareness, would be best implemented and administered by non-governmental organizations. NGOs have the potential to target and work with communities in multiple countries and less subjected to the influence of political representatives.
Ecolabels and the Certification of Sustainably-Caught Fish
In generating awareness about the importance of sustainable fisheries among consumers in developed countries, it is important to tie this into economic markets by establishing an ecolabel that is stamped onto fish that has been harvested from a fishery with good practices. By distinguishing sustainably-caught fish from fish that is harvested from declining stocks, we can encourage consumers to support companies that work to maintain the fisheries instead of exploiting them. The success of sustainable goods in the market today can be seen in the current market for organic and fair trade products. The dolphin-safe campaign provides evidence that labeling, coupled with awareness, can indeed have an affect on consumer behavior (Teisl et al., 2001).
As of right now there are several groups that "certify" and put a label on sustainable fish, the most prominent of which is the Marine Stewardship Council, an independent, non-profit organization based in the UK. Established in 1999 as a joint effort between industry (Unilever) and conservation (WWF), the MSC has certified 857 products as of September 2007 (MSC 2007). A major issue the MSC faces is the lack of publicity: because so few sustainable fish products exist and the council is independent of other larger conservation groups, the lack of name recognition has made it more difficult for the MSC to advertise the advantages of the ecolabeled products. Before the MSC began to market its products, a survey conducted in the U.S. in 1998 showed that only 5 percent of those polled would trust the MSC as a certification agency, compared to 23 percent for WWF and 49 percent for the National Marine Fisheries Service. Since then, markets such as Wal-Mart and Whole Foods have pledged to sell MSC-certified products (Gunther, 2006), which will undoubtedly have an impact because the two retailers tend to tailor to two very different types of consumers, but many other markets have yet to realize that by doing business with sustainable fisheries, they are insuring that their fish supply will not collapse in the future.
Meanwhile, the Global Aquaculture Alliance, another international NGO, has outlined standards for "best aquacultural practices," detailing measures that include property rights, biodiversity protection, environmental management, and food safety for both shrimp farms and shrimp hatcheries. Guidelines are also given for seafood processing plants. Foods processed at facilities that meet these standards are granted certification from the Aquaculture Certification Council, Inc.
We believe it would prove more effective for these organizations, and any other labeling intiatives that may form, to unite their efforts. This way the group could gain global trust and standardized labels could be provided for easy recognition of the meaning of the ecolabel. This model can be taken after the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, which brings together 20 different labeling initiatives under one name and one logo.
FLO International also plays an overarching role in linking the suppliers of fair trade products - such as the various producer organizations representing small farmers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America - to retailers and consumers in North America, Europe, and Australia. While the producers of sustainable fish can come from both the fisheries of both developed and developing nations, the sustainability label, like the fair trade label, will be targeted mainly towards consumers in developed countries who are most appealed by the "feel-good factor" and are most likely to be able to afford the luxury. The list of countries where MSC labeled food is currently sold is largely consistent with the countries that have fair trade intiatives. When Alaskan pollock received its MSC certification in 2004, Richard Muir, the president of Genuine Alaska Pollock Producers, expressed his hopes that the label would help the marketing group, and cited Europeans in particular as strong supporters of sustainable products (Alaska Pollock Press Release, 2004).
Regarding the design and labeling criteria, we propose a three tier system, consisting of red, yellow, and green labels. The red label will indicate a product from an unhealthy, unsustainable population which if possible should not be eaten. The yellow and green labels will indicate fish that are being fished in a sustainable manner with the difference being that they yellow labeled fish come from populations that have not yet completely recovered while the green labeled fish come from populations that have reached half of carrying capacity and are being fished at or slightly below maximum sustainable yield. We would encourage choosing green labeled fish over those with yellow labels, and strongly discourage any consumption of red labeled fish.
One obstacle that still stands in the way is money. Seventy-five percent of the MSC's funds comes from charitable grants (MSC, 2005), which, if too scarce, severely puts a limit to the size and scope of the labeling program. A part of the remainder of the money comes from profits from the licensing fee the MSC charges companies for the use of the label; the actual certification process is conducted and paid to a third party certification program. It would cost a company anywhere from $35,000 to $500,000 for the assessment of their facilities and fishing methods in order to qualify for certification (MSC, 2005), and the use of the logo costs a base fee plus 0.5% of the profits. This increase may be translated into increased prices for the consumer.
Raising Funds
A constant obstacle for all environmental efforts is cost. Campaigning, outreach, transition to sustainable practices, and a plethora of other initiatives would require funding and financial support. Many NGOs currently rely on charitable donations and occasionally funding from the government, but education and fundraising can also go hand-in-hand. Currently the World Wildlife Fund offers an Adopt-an-Animal program, where donors can decide to directly support up to 80 endangered species by giving money and, in return, receiving a stuffed animal and informational updates on the status of the species. Oceana has created a similar Adopt-a-Creature program focused on 16 marine animals. Another idea would be to take this one step further and start an Adopt-a-Fish program that would allow people to adopt different species of fish, which would promote to the public some more obscure types of fish.
An NGO may also want to take advantage of the growing consumer culture and create clothing, tote bags, posters, and bumper stickers that would present the dire reality of the fishery situation. These products could present anything from images to facts, and proceeds can go towards funding fish conservation intiatives.
Education Initiatives
We also propose the creation of an NGO which would help match college students learning to do environmental research with countries who need research conducted but lack researchers. The host country could provide housing and food, while the students' colleges and the students themselves can arrange transport. The preponderance of study-abroad programs in the United States attests to the desire of students to work abroad. Such a program would help countries gain valuable environmental data, while also educating students about environmental concerns on a global scale.
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Cooperation Between Developed States and Developing States
One of the most essential challenges facing developing states is the transition from a fish-dominated economy and diet to a less fish-dependent one. After all, for many of these developing states, the cheapest way to acquire protein and generate income is to fish their oceans - fish is free, regenerates without human effort, and comes at no cost to the harvester (no farming, plowing, or planning required). Thus, developing states often do not have incentives or reasons of why they should alter their economy. This is where assistance from developed states should come in.
Under Part XII, Section 3, Articles 202 and 203 require that "States shall, directly or through competent international organizations [which could include the RFB councils we have recommended]: promote programmes of scientific, educational, technical and other assistance to developing States for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. Such assistance shall include... training of their scientific and technical personnel; facilitating their participation in relevant international programmes; supplying them with necessary equipment and facilities; enhancing their capacity to manufacture such equipment; advice on and developing facilities for research, monitoring, educational and other programmes... [States shall also give developing nations preferential treatment for] the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance; and the utilization of their specialized services" (Division, 1984). Therefore, it is reasonable to enhance the system in which developed nations provide incentives for developing states to shift to more environmentally-sound aquaculture practices and fishing methods. In particular, financial assistance, technical education, and sharing of mutual scientific research are especially called for. The visit of scientific experts qualified in the areas of environmental conservation to developing countries should be sponsored. Moreover, joint ventures between the developing and the developed nations with the aim of creating mutual benefit through environmental conservation and deterring IUU fishing (for example: creating marine reserves or assisting with marine tourism in the target country) should be encouraged as a method of cooperation (Agenda 21). Also, developing nations and developed nations may work together in marine research, with developing nations supplying the labor and local knowledge of conducting the scientific experiments and the developed nations providing the experts in guiding and designing the experiments. Eventually, the technology can also shift over so that local experts will be trained and the developing nations will be able to generate research capabilities on their own. This creates revenue and promotes environmentalism amongst the bloc of developing nations. Mission hopes to encourage more collaboration between the developed and the developing worlds in order to stabilize marine ecosystems and eventually global fisheries. This collaboration can be nurtured through communication between the regional councils and continued interaction in the UN.
(CHILD PAGE 4 FOR INTERNATIONAL ENDS HERE)
(CHILD PAGE 5 FOR INTERNATIONAL STARTS HERE)
The Whaling Solution
We, as the Terrascope Mission 2011 group, recognize the need to protect whales from the threat of extinction and exploitation. Thus, we endorse the IWC zero catch limit moratorium (Link to Child page "Whaling Moratorium History") until sufficient research has proved that whale populations have reached a stable, sustainable level. The catch limits set for approved aboriginal communities should be kept in addition to existing whale sanctuaries. We also endorse the trading regulations set by CITES to prevent the import and export of endangered and threatened cetacean species.
We also recognize the need for scientific research to gain more information about whale populations. However, we advocate means of gathering data that do not involve the lethal killing of whales; other methods, such as tagging and sighting, would be preferred. Should lethal means are inevitable, a limit as to how many whales can be used should be set. Thus, we propose that all proposals involving lethal research must be approved by the Scientific Committee set up by the IWC, which would follow the guidelines issued by the Commission. The rate of usage during such research should not exceed the growth rate of the whale population; in the case that the growth rate of the population is not yet known, the number of whales used should not exceed 5% of the current population size (growth rates for whale populations have found between 3% and 12%) (IWC, 2007a). Article VIII of the 1946 IWC Convention must be amended to allow this change (IWC, 2007b).
Photo by Lindy Elkins Tanton
The remains of a pilot whale hunt.
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DO NOT include works cited on international page (ALL WORKS CITED FOR EVERY PAGE will go on the works cited page)
Works Cited
Milazzo, M. (2000). The World Bank: Subsidies in World Fisheries: A Re-examination. Technical Paper, No. 406, 4-6.
Benitah, M. (June 2004). Ongoing WTO Negotiations on Fisheries SUbsidies. ASIL Insights, 1-3.
Schrank, W. (2003). Introducing Fisheries Subsidies. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, 437, 1-5United Nations Division for Sustainable Development. (2004). Agenda 21, Chapter 34. Retrieved 21 November 2007, from: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter34.htm.
International Whaling Commission. (2007). Scientific Permits. Retrieved 19 November 2007, from: http://www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/permits.htm.
International Whaling Commission. (2007). Whale Population Estimates. Retrieved 19 November 2007, from: http://www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/estimate.htm.
Borger, J. (2001, March 29). Bush Kills Global Warming Treaty. The Guardian Unlimited: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews.
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