moving all of this under the main international cooperation page
New Tax Scheme!!!!!! Write-up below:
One of the greatest challenges presented by the current plight of worldwide fisheries is that of preventing overfishing. This prevention, if successful, will be the single greatest improvement over the current situation. How is this to be achieved? As long as there is a demand for fish, there will be motivation to fish and a risk of overfishing. The best possible solution to the problem of overfishing will therefore be the one which has the most probability of limiting catches to the maximum sustainable yield level.
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As per the suggestions of Professor Wheaton, economics professor as MIT, the premise of the tax we propose is straightforward. Based on data collected on populations through the methods stated above, the ecological health of fish populations around the world and the relative risk of these populations being overfished and becoming depleted could be assessed by an international group of biologists. These biologists would split up the global international ocean into a number, perhaps between twenty and thirty, of distinct regions (Wheaton, personal communication, November 21, 2007). The biologists would analyze the data from each region and determine the overall danger to fish populations in each of the regions. These biologist would then apprise a group of economists of their findings. The economists would use this information to set a tax that is heavier for fish caught in regions containing more depleted stocks and lighter for fish caught in areas where the populations are less at risk of being overfished, i.e. the level of fishing that can happen and still remain below or equal to the maximum sustainable yield is higher.
This new policy would be taxing the profits of fishermen, who are taking the fish from the ocean but are currently not charged for the environmental and social costs that are associated with taking a common resource. If a fisherman catches very little fish, he generates very little revenue from selling the fish, but if he catches too many fish, the amount he will be paying in taxes will largely detract from his revenue. There is a point in between the two extremes at which the fishermen will be making the maximum profit after he has paid his taxes, and the committee determining the level of the taxes will make this maximum profit point a number that will ensure the fisheries will be fished at a sustainable rate.
A tax on fishermen will drive up the price of fish for consumers down the line, which will in turn decrease the quantity of fish demanded and thus the number of fish needed to meet this demand. A market-based control on fishing decreases the fisherman's incentive to overfish. The fisherman still has freedom to fish wherever he wants (within other constraints), but the tax will encourage him to avoid fishing in areas that are in more danger of being overfished.
There have been no prior attempts to levy an international tax to curb environmental damage, but we believe that since fish are a common resource that travel between national borders, and fish from one fishery are often sold to consumers all over the world, no other environmental crisis has been so in need of international cooperation. Implementation of this tax scheme will begin following years of strict command-and-control management strategies, such as quotas, which will bring the status of many fisheries from "overfished" to "sustainably fished."
Given the volatile nature of fisheries and the environment in general, the level of taxes will need to be adjusted from time to time. Currently, data on fish populations is generally collected and reported every two years, meaning that this team of biologists and economists would reset the tax at least every two years to account for changing conditions, and perhaps more often based on preliminary data, estimates, or sizable environmental changes (such as natural disasters). Alterations to the taxes at intervals would be necessary to keep them relevant and useful, since a permanent and static tax would simply encourage individuals to fish in areas that are lightly taxed, leading to overfishing and populations crashes. After a time of altering the taxes to fit changing conditions, the fluctuation of populations will reach a minimum at which only small tweaking of the tax is required, contingent on catastrophic events such as natural disasters and famines.
A tax on fishermen will drive up the price of fish for consumers, which will in turn decrease demand for fish and incentive to fish. The fisherman still has freedom to fish wherever he wants (within other constraints), but the tax will encourage him to avoid fishing in areas that are in more danger of being overfished.
In the case of subsistence fishing and sportsfishing, we feel that quotas are still a better tool for maintaining a ceiling on the amount of fish caught for this purpose. Oftentimes subsistence fishermen have almost no choice about the location in which they fish, and they should not be penalized for this. This should also not be a reason for taking an unreasonable amount of fish. For sportsfisherman, permits can be issued to effect these quotas.
The tax would be administered internationally by the United Nations, provided for by the addition to the Law of the Sea Treaty that we propose. Only member countries would collect the tax, which eliminates the issue of taxation without representation. The revenue of the tax would then be redistributed internationally to these member countries to allow them to fund other aspects of our plan, like encouraging fishermen to switch to more environmentally sound methods of fishing. Countries who have signed the treaty are bound by it to fish sustainably in their own waters, and a tax is just another way for them to enforce this.
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