Chapter 4 : World War II: 1939-1946 

The Prewar Years 

The 1930s had been a period of great changes on the international scene, in the United States, and at MIT. Military confrontations and invasions in the Far East and Europe were warnings of armed conflicts to come, The Fall of 1939 saw the start of World War II. 

In the United States, the 1930s had produced far-reaching political, social, and economic changes. In 1939 President Roosevelt was in the third year of his second term. Military and technological preparedness as well as materials supplies and industrial production had become major concerns of the federal government. 'The Stockpiling Act of June 7, 1939 was the first legislation for the primary purpose of establishing stockpiles of strategic and critical materials for national defense and also authorizing exploration and development of domestic resources by the Department of the Interior" (Morgan, p. 4649). 

In physics and chemistry, fundamental theoretical advances in the 1920s had been paralleled by major experimental discoveries. Neutron bombardment of uranium (Hahn and Strassmann in January 1939) led to the recognition of nuclear fission in uranium and its potential for enormous energy release (Frisch and Meitner). This development induced Einstein to write to President Roosevelt. The President responded in late 1939 by establishing the Uranium Committee to assess the implications of the discovery. The Committee was soon integrated into the National Defense Research Committee created in June 1940. A year later all of these efforts came under the aegis of the new Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) headed by Vannevar Bush. 

Metallurgy and solid state science and engineering had progressed in theoretical and applied respects. Hume-Rothery's "Structure of Metals and Alloys" (1936), the "Theory of the Properties of Metals and Alloys" by Matt and Jones (1936), and Seitz's "Modern Theory of Solids" (1940) provided a basis for the understanding of practical applications. The theory of dislocations (Orowan in 1934; Polanyi in 1934; Taylor in 1934) provided a conceptual basis of very broad applicability. In experimental investigations, optical microscopy and X-ray diffraction continued to play important roles and were soon joined by electron microscopy. 

Among the condensed matter disciplines, physical metallurgy had attained a leading position with its growing understanding of age hardening, especially of aluminum alloys (Merica, Waltenberg, and Scott in 1920; Guinier and Preston in 1939), the transformations involved in the heat treating of steel (Davenport and Bain in 1930), and the mechanisms of the deformation of metals (Schmid and Boas in 1935). In chemical metallurgy, a beginning had been made in the application of physical chemistry to high-temperature processes, especially for steelmaking. 

Some of the methods and concepts of physical metallurgy were later applied to ceramic systems and led to the development of physical ceramics. Polymer chemists made major advances in the 1930s-in the understanding of the nature of polymers and in practical applications by the invention of such materials as nylon and synthetic rubber. Materials which assumed great technical importance after World War II, in particular, semiconductors and other materials for electronic applications, were beginning to attract attention (Weiner, p. 28).

Organizational Developments at MIT 

In 1939, Karl T. Compton was completing his ninth year as president of MIT. Vannevar Bush went to the Carnegie Institution and Edward L. Moreland succeeded him as Dean of Engineering. 

The Department of Metallurgy was in its third year as a separate department. The Department of Mining and Metallurgy had been split into two departments (President's 'Report for 1936- 37, p. 2; Institute Faculty Minutes for April 14, 1937). In a letter, President Compton stated that the decision had been made after careful study by the Executive Committee of the Corporation. He continued: "This action has been taken to meet the situation which has been created by the rapid development of these arts, particularly in the field of metallurgy. It is no longer possible to consider that a combined training can fit a man professionally for both fields, although it is obvious that there must continue to be some overlapping and much cooperation between them." 

The Department of Mining Engineering was to be discontinued as of June 1940 (Institute Faculty Minutes, April 14, 1937). The Department of Metallurgy, after a few years as Course XIX, was to be designated Course III. Mineral engineering was assigned to the Department of Metallurgy and mineral resources was assigned to the Department of Geology. The members of the Mining Engineering faculty in mineral engineering and fire assaying transferred to the Department of Metallurgy.

Electrochemical Engineering had been independent for some years as Course XIV, but enrollment had been very low. The Visiting Committee of the Department of Metallurgy recommended that "because of the expanding opportunities for the application of the methods of electrometallurgy, the advantages of training in these subjects be brought to a much larger circle of students." Professor Hayward reported that in 1937 Dean Bush told him: "We are going to put all the hot stuff in one place and I guess you are the man to do it" (Hayward, p. 18). The Department of Metallurgy took on the responsibility of teaching electrometallurgy, in particular a course on electric furnaces "which proved to be very popular" (Hayward, p. 19). Aqueous electrochemistry was transferred to Chemical Engineering. 

The Department of Metallurgy by the end of the 19305 had thus become involved with essentially the entire range of engineering materials of mineral origin. This was in accord with President Compton's statement: "It appears that under the changed circumstances of the present day, the best use of the Institute's facilities in training for the general field of the discovery, recovery and processing of minerals, calls for a change of emphasis and a broader approach" (Compton-Killian papers). 

Faculty 

The teaching and research programs of the Department of Metallurgy in the late 1930s ranged from mineral engineering (then still known as "ore dressing") through production metallurgy (or "process metallurgy") to physical metallurgy and the physics of metals. Ceramics was being pursued vigorously and gave the Department an early flavor of an interdisciplinary materials department. 

A teaching staff of approximately 20 conducted the Department's programs. The faculty had recently been enlarged, providing special strength in several areas of growing importance. Gaudin brought great expertise to the study of mineral engineering and particularly the flotation process. Chipman introduced physical chemistry and especially chemical thermodynamics to the teaching and investigation of production metallurgy. Wulff, working in powder metallurgy after an earlier involvement with metal physics, was the first faculty member in the Department primarily engaged in mechanical metallurgy (or "metal processing"). 

Active subject areas and faculty members in 1939, some of whom were in the Department of Mining Engineering at the time, are shown in the following: 

Active Subject Areas and Faculty Members in 1939 

Mineral engineering 

  • Locke
  • Gaudin 
  • Schuhmann 

Note: These faculty members were associated with tire Richards Ore Dressing Laboratory, which remained in the Department of Mining Engineering until 1940. 

Production metallurgy 

  • Bugbee
  • Swift
  • Reed 
  • Hayward
  • Chipman
  • Waterhouse 

Electrochemistry 

  • Thompson 

Physical metallurgy 

  • Williams
  • Homerberg 
  • Cohen
  • Floe 

Physics of metals 

  • J.T. Norton
  • Wulff 
  • Bitter
  • Kaufmann 

Ceramics 

  • FH. Norton 
  • Vinal 

Curriculum 

In the late 1930s, the options in undergraduate Metallurgy had been eliminated. As stated in the 1938 Course Catalogue (p. 74): "the two subdivisions [are] so closely interrelated that a sharp separation is not possible." The President's Report for 1937-38 commented: "As of the Fall of 1938, there was no longer a sharp distinction made between Process Metallurgy and Physical Metallurgy. It is believed that the new arrangement will equip students better for later professional work." However, aside from the Metallurgy option, Seniors could elect a Mineral Dressing option. Both options led to the B.S. degree in Metallurgy. 

The Faculty Minutes of May 19, 1937 report various changes in required subjects: two terms each of Applied Mechanics and Physical Chemistry, in addition to traditional subjects such as Analytical Chemistry and Testing Materials Laboratory. Metallurgical subjects were assigned mainly to the fourth year. A new subject in Theoretical Metallurgy dealing with atomic arrangements in alloys was offered (President's Report for 1936-37, p. 109). The President's Report for 1939-40 commented: "The teaching programs became more fundamental for the first three years." 

Laboratory instruction in production metallurgy and mineral engineering still followed the philosophy and tradition established by Professor Richards over 50 years earlier. In other areas new styles of laboratory instruction were introduced; Homerberg included failure analysis in physical metallurgy laboratories and J. T. Norton taught X-ray diffraction, emphasizing both theoretical and experimental aspects of the subject. 

Graduate Work and Research 

Graduate work was done in two "divisions": Process and Physical Metallurgy. Electrochemical Engineering was another area for graduate work. Ceramics had been a graduate option since 1933. 

An outstanding example of research conducted by faculty members in this period was Bitter's development of a large magnet. Professor Williams commented: "He has done an excellent piece of work in the development of his magnet. ... " Magnetic research was also carried out by Professor Albert R. Kaufmann. 

Summary 

The state and prospects of the field of metallurgy and of MIT s Department at the time of the outbreak of war in Europe can be summarized by quoting statements by President Compton: "Metallurgy as a profession is coming of age, and the promise of its maturity will best be fulfilled by the highest degree of scientific training. The metallurgist now requires not only a thorough training in the processes and physics of metallurgy, but a knowledge of physical chemistry, electrochemistry and ceramics. What metallurgy has accomplished in recent years in the development of innumerable alloys of steel and lighter metals, thus opening a new era in transportation and comfortable living, forecasts a future rich in prospect" (Technology Review, Vol. 39, May 1937, p. 286/Karl T. Compton announcement at Institute Faculty Meeting, April 14, 1937). 

Technology Review commented: "The new department of metallurgy will give special attention to physical and process metallurgy and metallurgical production ... The latter is concerned primarily with the economic and statistical functions of the industry" (Technology Review, Vol. 39, May 1937, p. 286). Although process metallurgy was, in fact, not "concerned primarily with the economic and statistical functions" of metals production, in retrospect an interest in the economics of materials was particularly timely in view of the wartime scarcities to come. 

The Transition from Peace to War-1939-1942 

On the surface, the educational and other normal activities at MIT appeared to be relatively unchanged for nearly three academic years after the war started in Europe. Regular teaching schedules were maintained through the Spring term of 1942. At the same time, defense-oriented research expanded greatly and special training courses directed toward emergency production were initiated (Burchard).

President Compton's annual reports to the Corporation reflected the progressive mobilization. In October 1939, he wrote: " ... our first duty, in this time of turmoil and danger, is to carry on our normal education program as effectively as possible and with a minimum of confusion." In 1940 he wrote: "In my report last year, as the European War was just beginning, I submitted my opinion that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's greatest service, in threat of war as in time of peace, was to continue as efficiently and uninterruptedly as possible its program of technological education and scientific research. That opinion still holds; but the progress of events has called for some new definitions of policy and modifications in procedure .... Where we possess ... personnel or equipment which can contribute in especially significant ways to the national defense program, we should direct them to this effort .... We should make this possible by Postponing less urgent research projects, by internal rearrangement of teaching schedules, and by carrying a more than normal per capita burden of work."

The changes in objectives and policies brought about by the war emergency were realized in new organizational structures and activities at MIT. The Radiation Laboratory was approved by the National Defense Research Committee on October 25, 1940 (Romanowski, p. 55). At about the same time, the Confidential Instruments Development Laboratory, later renamed Instrumentation Laboratory, became active. Both of these laboratories required assistance on materials problems. 

The academic departments began to adapt their activities to wartime conditions. The faculty and staff of the Department of Metallurgy became engaged in special training courses and accelerated in-house teaching and defense-related research. The research during the transition period will be described in the next section together with the research of the war years. 

The War Years- 1942-1945 

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 precipitated the United States into war. The period of gradual transition ended with the second term of the academic year 1941-42 and MIT went officially on a wartime footing. The war effort became dominant, called for a reordering of priorities, and affected essentially all of MIT. An educational core program for civilian students was maintained, but work related to military needs prevailed. 

Burchard in "QED: MIT in World War II" categorized MITs contibutions to the war effort as (i) research and development, (ii) special training courses, and (iii) personal services by staff members (Burchard, p. viii). Members of the Department of Metallurgy made contributions in all of these areas. 

Educational Activities 

The regular academic program was accelerated because most civilian students were, in fact, enrolled "on borrowed time" (U.S. Office on Education, Handbook on Education and the War, cited in Romanowski, p. 37). Allowing students to complete their studies if they could do so in a relatively short time proved to be a sound policy that served the national interest. This was particularly true of advanced undergraduates, including an appreciable number of students in Course III. 

Graduate students, increasingly in the transition period and especially after the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, "found themselves involved [in] or, worse, barred from secret defense research projects" (Romanowski, p. 36). "As early as December 1940, it was suggested that 'the customary examination upon the thesis will have to be waived or restricted to those officially connected with the project involved'" (Dean J.W.R. Bunker to J.R. Killian, December 5, 1940-after Romanowski, p. 36). Problems of this kind probably became severe in the Department of Metallurgy later than in the Departments of Aeronautics and Naval Engineering, which traditionally were concerned with some military applications. 

Some teaching activities by members of the Department of Metallurgy responded directly to wartime needs. Professor Williams mentioned to President Compton that there had been an increase in "metallography" enrollments (R.S. Williams to K. T. Compton, September 12,1941). Professors Homerberg and Cohen offered National Defense Training Courses in "Applications of Metallography" and gave special lectures on heat treatment for inspectors in the Boston area (Burchard, p. 194). Members of the Metallurgy Department also gave special service courses in the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) for a short time and the Navy V-12 program for longer (Burchard, p. 9). 

The total teaching load of the Department and especially that of some faculty members was lightened by the direct effects of the emergency and as the result of administrative policy. The direct effects arose from smaller classes, decreases in the number of theses, and curtailment of subject offerings (President's Report for 1943- 44). The administrative policy freed some faculty members from teaching duties to allow them to concentrate on war-related work. 

The attitude of the Institute administration is illustrated by the following example. In a letter dated March 13, 1941, Professor Williams wrote to Acting President Killian: "Dr. Homerberg is quite troubled because the increasing demands for his advice on metallurgical problems connected with the Defense program are interfering with his teaching time." Killian replied the following day: "[Hornerberg's] participation in this kind of work is entirely in line with one of the major objectives of the Institute-that it render a public service." This example demonstrates how MIT was able to make contributions to wartime research and development. In the same way, the Institute could free staff members for policy and administrative positions in industry and government. 

Consulting, Research and Development 

The defense and war-related activities of MIT faculty members ranged from consulting service by individuals to projects requiring organized large groups and organizational structures. It would have been difficult at the time, even in the absence of security regulations, to identify or summarize the war work of individuals; it is more so after nearly 50 years. Two sources, however, supply relevant details. Archival material, especially biographical and, in some cases, autobiographical writings, contain much information. Secondly, Burchard's "QED: MIT in World War II" recorded the war-related activities of MIT personnel; the data were derived from a survey by a questionnaire addressed to the MIT staff, conducted by J.J. Sharkey in 1945-46 and subsequently augmented. From these sources the contributions of the staff of the Department of Metallurgy can be reconstructed. 

Faculty members of the Department of Metallurgy contributed to the war effort as temporary staff members of other organizations, members of government committees, and consultants on technical problems for industry and government. As shown in Table 4-2, their major consultancy and committee involvements ranged from ore dressing to the physics of metals and from consulting on scientific and technical problems to the formulation and administration of policy, and the management of new technical developments. Faculty members also contributed to the work of wartime laboratories at MIT such as the Radiation Laboratory (as noted in two instances in Table 4-2) and the Instrumentation Laboratory. 

Major Committee and Consultancy Involvements by Metallurgy Faculty Members during World War II 

Gaudin 

  • Mining firms, government 
  • Processing of tin and tungsten ores 

Hayward 

  • War Production Board
  • Bureau of Mines 
  • Consulting on copper and general metallurgy 

Waterhouse 

  • Office of Production Management 
  • War Production Board 
  • Office of Lend Lease 
  • Five years of consulting on iron and steel problems 
  • Administration of special order covering tungsten 
  • Technical and exchange mission to UK 
  • Participation in lend-lease administration and foreign economic administration 
  • Foreign Economic Administration 

Williams 

  • National Defense Research Committee 
  • Quartermaster General Department 
  • Member of Metallurgy Section of Division 18 
  • Advisor 

Homerberg 

  • Rock Island Arsenal
  • Aircraft and ordnance concerns 
  • Technical Advisor R&D
  • Metallurgical problems in manufacturing 

Cohen 

  • Sheffield Foundation 
  • Boston Ordnance District
  • The MIT Metallurgical Project of the Manhattan Project 
  • Dimensional stability of metals 
  • Metallurgical consulting
  • Associate Director 

Floe 

  • Quartermaster General Department 
  • Industrial firms 
  • Equipment for mountain troops 
  • Metallurgical problems in manufacturing 

J.T. Norton 

  • University of California, Berkeley 
  • Radiation Laboratory 
  • Naval Ordnance Laboratory 
  • Research on stresses in welded armor plate 
  • Consulting on X-ray methods
  • Consulting on X-ray inspection 

F.H. Norton 

  • Radiation Laboratory 
  • The MIT Metallurgical Project of the Manhattan Project 
  • Alloy testing for aeronautical applications 
  • Ceramic development 

Gaudin and Schuhmann 

  • Manhattan Project 
  • Recovery of uranium from low-grade raw materials 

Chipman 

  • Manhattan Project 
  • Director, MIT Metallurgical Project; Chief, Metallurgy Section, Metallurgical Laboratory, University of Chicago; consulting for Los Alamos, NBS, Lawrence Livermore 

Sources: Burchard; biographical and autobiographical material 

Projects Conducted in or in Association with the Department of Metallurgy 

Department members also took part in the organization, direction and work of war-related projects conducted in, or in association with, the Department of Metallurgy. Several of these were of large size and protracted duration. The histories of these projects, will be considered below. 

  • Nonmagnetic steels: J. Chipman, M. Cohen, A.R. Kaufmann 
  • High-temperature alloys: N.J. Grant
  • Uranium supply: A.M. Gaudin, R. Schuhmann, Jr. 

The MIT Metallurgical Project of the Manhattan Project: 

  • Production of massive uranium from powder: J. Wulff, J. Chipman 
  • Uranium metallurgy: J. Chipman, A.R. Kaufmann, M.Cohen, 
  • Beryllium metallurgy: A.R. Kaufmann, M. Cohen 
  • Crucibles for plutonium: J. Chipman, F.H. Norton 

Burchard describes a project carried on in 1941 by Professor Chipman in collaboration with Professors Cohen and Kaufmann for the development of nonmagnetic steels that could be used for light armor near magnetic compasses. Burchard explains that "ordinary armor plate could not be used because of its effect upon the compass, yet the pilot. .. needed protection both on the bridge of a ship and in aircraft." The project, with the assistance of N.J. Grant and D.L. Guernsey among others, developed several suitable steels (Burchard, p. 183). 

A new subject, corrosion and heat-resistant alloys, had been included in 1931-32 among the subjects available to students, as mentioned in Chapter 3. In the early 1940s, the growing interest in gas turbines, turbo-superchargers, and jet propulsion units created an urgent need for materials that could withstand the attacks of ever higher temperatures and more corrosive atmospheres. In addition to possessing the properties required for performance in service, the alloys had to lend themselves to being formed into the desired shapes. Nicholas J. Grant, as Burchard reports, for three and one-half years directed a program of development, testing, and treatment of suitable alloys. The program, which required the application and refinement of the art of casting, was carried out in the first independent precision casting laboratory in the country. This wartime project was the beginning of a program on high-temperature metals, which, under Professor Grant's direction, has continued to the present. 

Manhattan Project 

The contributions of MIT's Department of Metallurgy to the Manhattan Project consisted of new developments in mineral dressing, metallurgy and ceramics. The most important of these developments will be described in the following. 

The development of atomic energy needed a large supply of uranium, but the available raw materials were of low grade and there was no experience in processing them. A uranium raw materials project was set up at MIT under Professor Gaudin as Director and Professor Schuhmann as Associate Director. Schuhmann, in an unpublished essay, has described how their research team attacked the technical problems and in particular how Gaudin, he, and their associates worked out a process suitable for uranium-bearing gold ore tailings. Since the process originally assigned to the laboratory for investigation was unpromising, the investigators had to learn to try other approaches in spite of restrictions on comrnunirations due to the compartmentalization imposed by the government in the interests of security. The team succeeded in devising new, innovative, and practical technology for recovering uranium from low-grade raw materials. By the middle of the 1950s the work was declassified and published (Schuhmann). 

According to an account by Burchard, Professor Wulff applied powder metallurgy briquetting techniques to uranium and produced solid shapes of the metal which were shipped to the "Metallurgical Project" at the University of Chicago. In a related effort, Professor Chipman, in collaboration with R.J. Anicetti of Metal Hydrides, Inc., had worked on a similar problem and had derived a method for producing solid uranium castings from powder. Burchard writes that, with the assistance of researchers borrowed from the University of Chicago, "the method was perfected and the equipment enlarged to handle several hundred pounds of metal a day. The castings produced were for the now celebrated 'pile', which was built under the North Stands at Stagg Field in Chicago and produced atomic power for the first time on 2 December 1942" (Burchard, pp. 210-211). 

The work on the consolidation of uranium was followed by a series of metallurgical investigations involving uranium and beryllium metal and an extensive ceramic investigation carried out at MIT. There is no clearer or more authentic way to report these investigations than by quoting Professor Chipman, the director of the MIT Metallurgical Project of the Manhattan Project. The following paragraphs are taken from his autobiography prepared in 1977 for the National Academy of Sciences. 

My war work was mainly with the Chicago division of the Manhattan Project. It began at MIT with the development of vacuum furnaces for melting and casting the pyrophoric uranium powder produced by Metal Hydrides. Arthur Compton asked me to come to Chicago as Chief of the Metallurgy Section of the Metallurgical Laboratory. I had four very competent group leaders ... Also I maintained the contact with other metallurgical laboratories at Battelle Institute, National Bureau of Standards, Ames, Iowa and MIT. ... At MIT the work was in part a continuation of my earlier work. When Cyril Smith at Los Alamos complained that he could not buy sound beryllium rods, the MIT group under Morris Cohen and Al Kaufmann modified the uranium furnace to melt and cast the commercial product. This was then extruded by a method developed by Kaufmann of using a copper or soft iron jacket as a lubricant around the beryllium billet. The coating was then stripped off leaving a sound beryllium rod. 

A principal problem at Chicago was the protection of fuel elements against corrosion by the cooling water of the Columbia River. After many trials of dipped or plated coatings it became evident that the uranium "slugs," about 8 inches long and 1 1/4 inches diameter, would have to be encased in a metal jacket. Aluminum was the obvious metal. John Howe's studies of corrosion had demonstrated that an aluminum cover and the aluminum tube were adequately resistant to Columbia River water. The aluminum "cans" were impact-extruded by Alcoa. We had to develop a method for canning the slug such that complete thermal contact existed at every point. This problem was solved by Al Greninger by dipping the slug into a molten zinc-base solder and inserting it, hot, into the can. The excess aluminum was trimmed oft the end crimped on an aluminum end piece and the closure completed by the then very new heliarc welding. The success of the Hanford reactors depended upon 100 percent perfection in the pieces. One failure could have meant catastrophe. Imperfection in the bond between slug and can could cause a hot spot with failure of not only the piece but the whole pile. The inspection method known as the frost test was developed by AI Kaufmann at MIT, perfected in Chicago and set up at Hanford. The pieces were immersed over dry ice in acetone. When brought out they frosted in the air. At any spot where the bond was imperfect the frost melted rapidly and any such piece was discarded. After the war was over and at the time the Smythe Report was written there had not been one failure in the Hanford reactors. In my opinion both Greninger and Kaufmann should have had the Medal of Merit; but then no one asked me. 

With Hanford in operation my attention turned to helping Los Alamos. I have mentioned Kaufmann's perfection of beryllium. The next was production of crucibles for the vacuum-melting of plutonium and enriched uranium. Several ceramic laboratories declined to undertake it and I persuaded F.H. Norton at MIT to take it on. It was about this time also that I began spending most of my time at MIT with frequent visits to Los Alamos. For melting uranium we perfected a high-purity magnesia crucible and these were made in several sizes and considerable numbers. At the start it was thought that plutonium would have to be oxygen-free. Our experience with other metals indicated that a non-oxide crucible would be needed. Leo Brewer at Berkeley showed that the most stable sulfides were CeS and ThS and he made a number of small crucibles of each. We concentrated on CeS of larger sizes. Cerium sulfide was not available and, following Brewer, we converted Ce~2~ O~3~, to CeS, by reaction with H,S; this was hydrogen-reduced to Ce,S, and the final step was further reduction with metallic cerium. The resulting brassy product was ground and shaped into crucibles which were fired in vacuo using a graphite susceptor at 17000 C. We had progressed up to about 4 inches high by 2 inches diameter when it was discovered that a little oxygen would do-no harm and thereafter plutonium was melted in our MgO crucibles.

Materials Policy and Materials Research Elsewhere at MIT 

Materials problems were also being addressed in other parts of the Institute. On the level of policy, President Compton served on the Baruch Committee, which was concerned with the country's supply of rubber. Experimental work directed at the reclamation of rubber, especially neoprene and butadiene, was conducted by Professor Ernst A. Hauser of the Department of Chemical Engineering. Research projects in other departments involving materials problems were concerned with dielectrics and synthetic mica, fluoride crystals, the properties of roller bearings, and the flame hardening of steel. 

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