Page History

Adam

D.

WILLIAMS

Academic

Background:

• 2012

• -

• present

• •

• MIT,

• ESD:

• PhD

• student

• in

• Engineering

• Systems

*

• 2007

• •

• Texas

• A&M

• University,

• George

• Bush

• School

• of

• Government

• and

• Public

• Service:

• Master

• of

• International

• Affairs

*

• 2004

• •

• Texas

• A&M

• University,

• Dwight

• Look

• College

• of

• Engineering:

• BS

• in

• Mechanical

• Engineering

h4.

Work

Experience:

• 2011

• -

• Present

• •

• Sandia

• National

• Laboratories

• •

• Albuquerque,

• New

• Mexico,

• USA

\\

• 
  Senior

• R&D

• Systems

• Engineer,

• International

• Security

• Engineering

• Department:

**

• • Sandia

• • project

• • lead

• • for

• • NA-24's

• • Gulf

• • Nuclear

• • Energy

• • Infrastructure

• • Institute

• • (GNEII)

**

• • Physical

• • protection

• • lead

• • (and

• • Sandia

• • project

• • lead)

• • for

• • NA-25's

• • cooperation

• • on

• • the

• • China

• • Center

• • of

• • Excellence

• • for

• • Nuclear

• • Security

• • and

• • Nonproliferation

**

• • Research

• • member

• • for

• • Sandia

• • project

• • on

• • systems

• • dynamics,

• • resilience,

• • and

• • complex,

• • adaptive,

• • system

• • of

• • systems

• • (CASoS)

• • modeling

• • of

• • nonproliferation

**

• • Policy

• • analysis

• • for

• • Sandia's

• • global

• • security

• • engagement,

• • nuclear

• • nonproliferation

• • and

• • international

• • security

• • projects.

*

• 2008

• -

• 2011•

• Sandia

• National

• Laboratories

• •

• Albuquerque,

• New

• Mexico,

• USA

• 
  Member

• of

• the

• Technical

• Staff,

• International

• Security

• Technical

• Systems

• Analyst

**

• • Vulnerability

• • assessment

• • and

• • physical

• • protection

• • system

• • design

• • and

• • analysis

• • for

• • NNSA/NA-25

• • and

• • NA-21

• • international

• • programs

**

• • Project

• • manager

• • for

• • NA-24's

• • Gulf

• • Nuclear

• • Energy

• • Infrastructure

• • Institute

• • (GNEII)

**

• • Policy

• • analysis

• • for

• • Sandia's

• • global

• • security

• • engagement,

• • nuclear

• • nonproliferation

• • and

• • international

• • security

• • projects.

*

• 2007

• -

• 2008

• •

• Nuclear

• Security

• Science

• &

• Policy

• Institute

• •

• College

• Station,

• TX,

• USA

\\

• 
  Temporary

• Research

• Assistant

**

• • Provided

• • foundation

• • research

• • for

• • the

• • systems

• • and

• • risk

• • analysis

• • team

• • of

• • the

• • Smuggled

• • HEU

• • Interdicting

• • through

• • Enhanced

• • anaLysis

• • and

• • Dectectors

• • (SHIELD)

• • project

• • (

{link-window:href=http://shield.tamu.edu|type=normal|target="_blank"}[http://shield.tamu.edu]{link-window}) ** Expanded the usability of

• • )
  • Expanded the usability of NSSPI-07-051:

• • Network

• • Analysis

• • of

• • Nuclear

• • Terrorism

• • Pathways

• • (

{link-window:href=http://nsspi.tamu.edu|type=normal|target="_blank"}[http://nsspi.tamu.edu]{link-window}). * 2007 - 2008 • Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs • College Station, TX, USA \\ Temporary Research Associate ** Research, fact-checking and writing for (and acknowledged in) Absher,

• • ).
• 2007 - 2008 • Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs • College Station, TX, USA
  Temporary Research Associate
  • Research, fact-checking and writing for (and acknowledged in) Absher, M.K.,

• • M.C.

• • Desch,

• • and

• • R.

• • Popadiuk.

 

• •   (2012)

_

• • Privileged

• • and

• • Confidential:

• • The

• • Secret

• • History

• • of

• • the

• • President’s

• • Intelligence

• • Advisory

• • Board

_

• • .

 

• •   The

• • University

• • of

• • Kentucky

• • Press.

h4.

Research

Domain:

NUCLEAR

SECURITY:

*

Viewing

nuclear

security

as

a

complex,

socio-technical

system

provides

a

useful

mental

map

for

visualizing

how

the

interconnections

of

and

interactions

between

physical

protection

system

technologies

(cameras,

sensors,

barriers

e.g.)

and

organizational

processes

(operations

and

‘security

culture,’

e.g.)

affect

facility

performance.

 

  Nuclear

security

is

not

a

well-defined

term,

ranging

in

meaning

from

facility-level

design

concerns

to

a

topic

of

national

policy

to

the

center

of

(desired)

international

cooperation.

 

  Gaps

of

knowledge

in

the

domain

include

understanding

the

interactions

and

feedbacks

between

the

technical

and

social

components

of

security

systems

(at

the

facility

level)

and

provided

a

useful,

common

framework

on

which

to

base

national

policy

and

international

cooperation.

  Starting from

 
Starting from current,

well-established

International

Atomic

Energy

Agency

(IAEA)

guidelines

for

security

and

current

Nuclear

Regulatory

Commission

(NRC)

protocols,

case

studies

of

known

attacks

on

nuclear

facilities

will

be

analyzed

as

empirical

evidence

for

developing

this

new

systems-based

theory

of

nuclear

security.

 

  The

core

development

of

‘system

security’

will

be

aided

by

aggregating

data

from

case

studies

of

high

value,

industrial

thefts

(i.e.,

high

value

diamond

or

bank

vault

thefts).

 

  The

developed

model

for

'system

security'

will

then

be

compared

against

traditional

methods

of

security

system

analysis

for

a

hypothetical

facility

used

by

the

IAEA

or

representative

data

from

real

facilities.

h4. Research

Research Methodology:

Systems

theory

*

provides

the

concepts

and

tools

necessary

for

understanding

the

characteristics

of

and

interactions

between

individual

components

of

complex,

socio-technical

systems.

 

  A

better

understanding

of

overarching

system

structures,

the

internal

component

dynamics,

and

the

relationship

between

the

two

is

necessary

to

better

design

and

analyze

socio-technical

systems.

 

  Similarly,

the

*

System-Theoretic

Accident

Model

and

Process

(STAMP)

methodology

*

draws

on

concepts

from

engineering,

mathematics,

cognitive

and

social

psychology,

organizational

theory,

political

science

and

economics

to

model

these

structures,

dynamics,

and

relationships.

 

  Similarly,

*

system

dynamics

*

provides

a

mathematical

tool

for

understanding

the

temporal

changes

to

the

structural

complexity,

structural

dynamics,

and

behavioral

feedbacks

of

a

socio-technical

system.

 

  It

also

provides

a

good

way

to

model

the

dynamics

processes

behind

changes

in

static

system

control

structures.

h4.

Research

Description:

Though

security-related

technologies

continue

to

advance,

decreasing

operating

budgets

and

lack

of

connection

to

‘return

on

investment’

are

stressing

traditional

models

of

security

design

and

analysis.

 

  Despite

gleaning

some

aspects

of

the

successful

reinvention

of

nuclear

safety

after

the

Three

Mile

Island

(1979)

and

Chernobyl

(1986)

accidents,

nuclear

security

is

still

lacking.

 

  Today’s

approaches

to

nuclear

security

mirror

traditional

models

of

accident

causality

(probabilistic

risk

assessment,

event

trees,

fault

trees,

etc.)

that

assume

component

failure

as

the

source

of

the

loss

event

and

that

increased

component

reliability

will

prevent

accidents

(incidents).

 

  Such

a

reductionist

analytical

paradigm

is

untenable

for

the

systems

of

today,

where

interactions

between

technical

and

social

(i.e.,

organizational)

system

components

can

exponentially

increase

complexity.

 

  In

response,

the

‘System-Theoretic

Accident

Model

and

Process

(STAMP)’

provides

a

new

methodological

approach

of

causation

for

analyzing

(and

designing

against)

safety

accidents,

especially

those

involving

complex,

socio-technical

systems.

  In much the same way, ‘the fast pace of technological

 

In much the same way, ‘the fast pace of technological change,’

‘reduced

ability

to

learn

from

experience,’

‘changing

nature

of

\

[security

\

]

incidents

and

\

[adversaries

\

],’

‘new

types

of

hazards,’

and

‘increasing

complexity

and

coupling’

challenge

traditional

approaches

to

security

design,

analysis

and

implementation

for

nuclear

facilities

in

current

dynamics

environments.

 

  Employing

the

underlying

causality

model

(i.e.,

actions

that

move

the

system

toward

a

vulnerable

state);

emphasizing

the

systems

understanding

of

the

state

of

the

system

(i.e.,

eliminating,

minimizing

or

mitigating

vulnerable

states

of

the

system);

and

implementing

the

analytical

paradigm

shift

(i.e.,

from

preventing

failures

to

enforcing

security

constraints)

of

STAMP

provides

a

mechanism

for

understanding

the

endogenous

nature

of

security.

 

  What

emerges

is

a

complex,

socio-technical

system

property

--

– ‘system

security’

--

– manifested

in

the

nuclear

realm

at

the

intersection

of

security

technology;

nuclear

material

accounting

and

control;

organizational

management

and

culture;

and

national

and

international

collaboration

politics. h4. {link-window:href=http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=iSMBHk4AAAAJ|type=normal|target="_blank"}Publications{link-window} {htmlcomment}

politics.